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popular sectors. Modern populism then established 
itself as the foremost democratic challenger of liberal 
representative democracy. It is a presence that haunts 
representative politics, particularly in times of crisis. 
The relevance of modern populism can be seen 
today as populism has extended well beyond the 
region where it was born. Populist movements are 
gaining traction in old and new democracies alike. A 
new generation of populist leaders have come to power 
in very different national settings and are committed 
to bring the ideal of populist democracy to life. From 
Venezuela to Hungary, populist administrations have 
engaged in processes of constitution-making and/
or legislative reforms with the goal of re-founding 
democracy on a new basis. This article traces the 
genealogy of a model of democracy that arose in 
Latin America in the mid-1940s and that has attained 
significant momentum in today’s politics. 
This article is organized as follows: section one 
presents a brief historical description of the rise and 
contours of classical Peronism in Argentina, section 
two describes the main tenets of the democratic model 
of modern populism through an analysis of some of the 
Latin America has been the breeding ground for a 
particular interpretation of democratic ideals: modern 
populism. While populism has been a constant 
feature of politics, the concept of modern populism 
refers to a historically delimited concept that arose 
at the beginning of what is generally referred to as 
“the second democratizing wave” (Huntington 1991). 
Modern populism represents a specific democratizing 
path that resulted in processes of social and political 
incorporation through an electoral regime that departed 
in significant ways from the liberal representative 
canon that was being promoted by the triumphal 
Allied Powers in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. Modern populism proposed an alternative path at 
democratic institutionalization from that of the liberal 
model. It arose at a particular historical juncture 
marked on the one hand, by the defeat of fascism and 
on the other hand, by the rise to prominence of the 
two regimes that would confront each other during the 
Cold War period: liberal democracy and communist 
dictatorship. Modern populism sought to position 
itself as a third way, one that could successfully 
promote the social and political incorporation of the 
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institutional transformations promoted by Peronism in 
government, and section three analyses the comeback 
of such a democratic model in contemporary politics, 
as well as the distinguishing trait that differentiates 
contemporary from classical expressions of populism.
I. Peronism and the creation of modern 
populism
The rise of Peronism in Argentina in the mid-1940s 
marked the birth of the modern model of populism. The 
most distinctive feature differentiating modern from 
previous expressions of populism was the former’s 
rejection of dictatorial politics and its commitment 
to democratic institutions. Such commitment gives 
way to efforts at institutionalizing a particular form 
of democracy. The notion of modern populism 
consequently refers to a particular subtype of populism: 
to expressions of populism that have reached power and 
consequently are in a position to engage in processes 
of institutional transformation to establish a populist 
regime. The rise of Peronism in Argentina gave life to 
the first expression of a populist democratic regime. 
Such an experience would soon be followed by other 
Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Peru, and 
Ecuador. In all those cases, populist governments 
propelled processes of democratization that changed 
the institutional and social landscape of their 
respective societies. As a consequence, the populist 
period in Latin America are always associated with 
the transition from semi-democratic or authoritarian 
regimes to mass democracy (Germani 1971, Di Tella, 
Collier and Collier 1991). 
Peronism stands out from the rest of the regional 
expressions of populism not only because it was the 
first one to establish the foundations of a populist 
democracy, but also due to the extent and lasting 
consequences of the changes that it promoted. The 
experience represented a turning point in Argentine 
history and Peronism has since then remained the 
most influential electoral force in the country. 
While Peronism has assumed many forms 
and identities and has governed Argentina in five 
periods:1946-1955 (the first two presidential terms 
of Perón); 1973-1976 (Perón’s third presidency, 
succeeded by vice president Isabel Perón after his 
death in 1974); 1989-1999 (Carlos Menem’s two 
presidential terms); 2000-2003 (Eduardo Duhalde’s 
interim administration); and 2003-2015 (the period 
that comprises a presidential term of Nestor Kirchner 
and the two subsequent periods of Cristina Fernandez 
de Kirchner), the focus of the present analysis is on 
“the classical” and founding moment of Peronism: 
the regime that spanned from 1946, when Juan 
Domingo Perón was elected president of Argentina, 
to 1955, when Perón was removed from power by a 
military coup. During those years, Perón set up the 
foundations of a modern populist regime, establishing 
an institutional and political blueprint that has since 
haunted liberal representative regimes in Latin 
America, and more recently, worldwide. In an epoch 
where populism has made a comeback and converted 
itself into a global phenomenon, an analysis of the 
basis of modern populism can help us understand 
what is the nature of this enduring (and increasingly 
influential) understanding of democracy.
The phenomenon of Peronism is closely related 
to the person of Juan Domingo Perón, an army 
officer who broke into the Argentine political scene 
in the 1940s as an influential figure of the military 
regime that had been established on June 4, 1943. 
The military regime was the second such military 
experience since the country’s attempt to promote a 
transition from oligarchical rule to mass democracy. 
The political regime established in 1860, which is 
generally referred as “the conservative order” (Botana 
1977), inaugurated a new political stage of Argentine 
politics marked by the closing of the state and a regime 
building period. Yet, the era of political peace that the 
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oligarchical republican order instated was relatively 
short lived. Already by 1980, the political order was 
being questioned by a new political organization, The 
Radical Party (UCR), organized around the claim of 
free elections. Eventually, an electoral reform was 
passed in 1912, which resulted in the election of 
the Radical Party’s leader, Hipólito Yrigoyen, to the 
presidency. 
The election of Yrigoyen inaugurated a novel yet 
short-lived democratic experience: the democratic 
regime only lasted fourteen years, coming to a close in 
1930, when a military coup removed Yrigoyen (who 
was then serving a second presidential term) from 
power. The episode not only truncated Argentina’s 
first attempt at consolidating a mass democracy but 
initiated a half-century long period of institutional 
instability and military intervention in politics that 
would last until the 1983 election of Raul Alfonsin to 
the presidency. 
Despite their intentions, the military authorities that 
took power in 1930 did not stay for very long. A return 
to civilian rule soon came, yet one that was marked by 
the tampering with electoral institutions to prevent the 
majoritarian Radical Party from returning to power. 
This period of fraudulent electoral politics came to an 
end in 1943 when a pro-fascist military intervention 
took power. The military government banned political 
parties, dissolved congress, intervened in provincial 
administrations, established press censorship, and 
imposed religious education on the public school 
system, while promoting a purge of communist and 
other “undesirable elements” from trade unions, 
universities, and the public administration. It is during 
this period that Colonel Perón made his entrance into 
the national political scene. Perón had been appointed 
to the National Labor and Welfare Department (which 
he later upgraded to a Secretariat), a post which he 
used to develop political support from the labor 
movement. During his tenure in the Secretariat, Perón 
introduced generous fringe benefits, wage increases, 
and the enforcement of labor legislation, gaining 
increased political ascendancy within Argentine labor 
organizations. 
The authoritarian measures of the military regime 
generated great political and civic uneasiness in 
large sectors of Argentine society. Awakened and 
inspired by the imminent fall of European fascist 
regimes, political opponents to the dictatorship 
began to mobilize, calling for a return to democratic 
rule. A massive mobilization of opposition forces in 
defense of “constitutionalism and liberty” took place 
in Buenos Aires in September 1945. The protest was 
followed a few days later by an aborted military coup 
from dissident liberal groups of the Armed Forces. 
President General Farrell, pressured by members of 
the cabinet and the Armed Forces, dismissed Perón 
from his governmental post and imprisoned him 
on Martin García Island in early October 1945. At 
Perón’s departure, his partisans in the labor unions 
launched a campaign for his freedom that culminated 
in a mass mobilization of working-class sectors 
to Buenos Aires’s central square in October 17.1 
After some negotiations, Perón was released and 
allowed to address the crowd of supporters from 
the balcony of the governmental house in Plaza de 
Mayo. In his speech, which was broadcasted on the 
radio, Perón promised to lead the people to victory 
in the upcoming presidential elections. The campaign 
polarized around the figure of Perón and the Union 
Democrática, an electoral coalition that integrated 
the then most relevant political parties (UCR, 
Socialist Party, Partido Democráta-Progresista, and 
Communist Party) with the aim to fight what they 
considered was a pro-fascist military dictatorship. The 
1 October 17, 1945 is considered as the founding day of Peronism and since then has remained as the most significant episode of Peronist 
imagery. For an analysis of the political events of that day see Torre 1995. For an analysis of the symbolic uses of the event, see Plotkin 
2003, chapters 3 and 4
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While the electoral outcomes displayed a relative 
parity of forces between Perón and his contenders, 
the distribution of electors, legislative members, and 
governorships gave an overwhelming majority to the 
former’s political force. 
Perón’s government inaugurated a new era 
in Argentine history characterized by the full 
incorporation of popular sectors into public life. 
Particularly during the first administration, the 
government promoted a strategy of economic growth 
and full employment based on a process of income 
redistribution via wage increases. This also included 
industry promotion by stimulating consumption and 
the expansion of the domestic market, the provision of 
subsidies and credit, and the addition of protectionist 
tariffs. Throughout Perón’s two administrations, trade 
unions were strengthened under a corporatist scheme 
of state supervision and the working class’ share of the 
national income rose dramatically: the share of wages 
in the National Gross Domestic Product jumped from 
37 per cent in 1946 to 47 percent in 1955, largely 
thanks to the generalization of a system of collective 
bargaining that covered more than 80% of unionized 
workers. 
The historical resilience of Peronism cannot 
be solely explained in terms of the substantial 
improvements the regime generated in the material 
conditions of the working class. Peronism also played 
a crucial symbolic role via the politics of recognition 
(dignificación) of popular sectors that resulted in 
the democratization of everyday life interactions, 
such as those in the workplace and public spaces, as 
well as the democratization of consumption patterns 
and leisure activities. In this way, the policies and 
initiatives of the regime altered established patterns 
of deference and respect that had previously regulated 
the interaction between elites and the popular sector. 
The distributive and symbolic dimension of the 
policies of Peronism profoundly changed the nature 
of Argentine society and gave way to a political and 
economic system in which popular sectors acquired 
a predominant place. That is what has established 
Peronism as an enduring political force that, despite 
its many faces and incarnations, still retains (seven 
decades after its birth) considerable electoral support 
within the lower classes.
While there has been ample discussion of the 
economic and redistributive policies implemented 
during the period (Collier and Collier 1991: 331-343) 
as well as about the “politics of recognition” that 
Peronism promoted within the working classes 
and the poor, none of those aspects is the focus of 
this article. Rather, in the next section the analysis 
seeks to disentangle the institutional features that 
gave the democratic experience of the Perón years 
its distinctiveness. As it will be shown, Peronism 
expressed a particular form of power exercise that laid 
out the foundations of the modern populist conception 
of democracy. The democratic imprint that Peronism 
promoted between 1946 and 1955 resulted in a 
particular interpretation of democratic ideals, one that 
has gained ascendancy in recent years. The next section 
describes the institutional features that contributed to 
the building of the populist democratic model.
II. The populist model of democracy
Modern populism is an original response to a particular 
global and regional conjuncture. On the one hand, 
global politics were marked by the end of World War 
II and the efforts of a triumphal United States to spread 
the model of liberal democracy to those countries 
where fascism had been defeated. On the other hand, 
Latin America was facing what the literature would 
referred to as “a crisis of incorporation” that signaled 
the decline of the oligarchic order and the arrival 
of mass politics. Latin American populist regimes 
would play a pivotal role in that historical juncture 
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as a vehicle for working class mobilization (Collier 
and Collier 1992; Germani 1971). They offered a 
particular democratizing path to channel the transition 
from semi-democratic or openly authoritarian regimes 
into mass democracy. In doing so, they helped establish 
a distinctive democratic model: populist democracy. 
Modern populism embraces the principle of popular 
sovereignty, establishing it as the organizing dimension 
of democratic politics. In doing so, populist democracy 
places elections as the paradigmatic mechanism 
of a plebiscitarian understanding of democratic 
representation that is openly hostile to other dimensions 
of representative democracy such as the principle of 
limited government. The rise of Peronism gave life to the 
first and most classical expression of modern populism, 
creating an elected populist regime that inaugurated 
a new stage in the broader history of populism. As 
Federico Finchelstein puts it, “If democracy starts in 
Athens, modern democratic populism starts in Buenos 
Aires” (Finchelstein 2004: 468). 
What are the main tenets of the populist democratic 
model? The ideal of populist democracy organizes 
around thee pillars: a) establishing elections as the key 
institutional mediation between leader and the people, 
b) undermining the centrality of liberal intermediating 
structures such as parliament and the public sphere, 
and c) erasing the distinction between constitutional 
and ordinary legislation.
Elections
In light of the historical challenges that Argentina 
encountered in consolidating a democratic regime 
based on free and competitive elections, it is 
not surprising that elections played a key role in 
developing the democratic credentials of Peronism. 
Elections provided the pivotal element for granting 
democratic character to an otherwise illiberal regime 
that introduced authoritarian practices and institutions 
in several areas of political life. Electoral reform 
had been a key issue in the agenda of opposition 
movements seeking to democratize the oligarchic 
order. The passing of the Saenz Peña law in 1912 made 
possible the election of an opposition leader to the 
presidency, breaking the hold that conservative elites 
had enjoyed on the presidential selection formula 
(Botana 1977). The electoral triumph of Radical 
Party leader Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1916 inaugurated 
an era of mass electoral politics in Argentina, yet the 
experience was short-lived: in September 10, 1930 a 
military coup put an end to this democratic period. 
While the military did not remain in power for long, 
calling for elections in November 1931, the return 
to civilian rule was tarnished by fraudulent electoral 
practices and the proscription of the Radical Party. 
The period become known as the “Infamous Decade” 
due to the predominance of a political system based 
on manipulated elections. Such a background explains 
why the issue of free elections figured as a prominent 
aspect of Perón’s rhetoric. On numerous occasions 
he made reference to past violations of the electoral 
rights of the population and proudly declared that the 
days of electoral fraud were finally over:
“In the political realm... we swept away all 
the ills that affected the country for almost a 
century, and we began by suppressing what gave 
Argentine democracy a vice of nullity: electoral 
fraud, fraud that made visible to the eyes of any 
spectator what an awful and terrible lie Argentine 
democracy was...” (Perón 1949: 21)
The free nature of elections was also repeatedly 
stressed:
“Today Argentine elections are honorable and 
clean, and there will be no fraud as long as I am 
in office, since it is my belief that there can be no 
democracy based on the lie of a staged election. 
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For many years, our country witnessed fraudulent 
elections. Elections were carried out in the post 
office, where the content of the ballot box was 
changed, or in the very voting site, where citizens 
were not allowed to vote. Because here we have 
witnessed a man who went to vote, who after 
handing his document to the authorities would 
be answered: ʻit’s okay (sic), you have already 
voted’ and the one that had voted for him was 
the local caudillo.  All elections were like that. A 
permanent lie. We had the Army supervise every 
electoral ballot box... and put an end to fraud.” 
(Perón, 1949, p. 97) 
Elections, alongside the principle of social justice, 
became the defining feature of the Peronist model of 
democracy. Peronism granted elections a paradigmatic 
role as the key intermediating mechanism between 
the Argentine people and their leader. In this sense, 
elections gained preeminence over other mechanisms 
of political intermediation that were dear to liberalism, 
such as parliament or the public sphere. 
Perón devoted a great deal of resources and time 
to electoral issues with the aim of preserving as well 
as expanding his electoral base. During Perón’s initial 
administration the government actively promoted 
processes of suffrage expansion, most notably via the 
sanctioning in September 1947 of the law that granted 
women the right to vote. Another crucial moment was 
the granting of voting rights to the population that lived 
in the so-called “national territories,” thanks to a law 
that changed their political status to that of provinces. 
Such process took place in three stages: in 1951, La 
Pampa and Chaco were “provincialized,” followed by 
Misiones in 1953, and Neuquén, Río Negro, Formosa, 
Chubut y Santa Cruz in 1955.  Both initiatives led 
to a notable growth of the Argentine electorate and 
strengthened Peronism’s electoral performance in 
ulterior electoral contexts (Little, 1973).
Elections, specially presidential ones, occupy a 
place of privilege in the populist democratic model 
for they represent the paradigmatic instance of 
institutional intermediation between leader and people. 
Electoral institutions seek to establish the political 
and institutional supremacy of the presidential figure 
over other representative institutions. To that end, 
the regime promoted a series of practices to ensure 
its electoral supremacy. The sanctioning of the 1949 
constitution introduced important changes into the 
electoral system, most of all, the replacement of 
indirect by direct voting in the presidential formula, 
the possibility of the immediate and unlimited 
reelection of the President, and the replacement of 
the system of the Saenz Peña’s law’s incomplete lists 
with a winner-takes-all type of scheme. The change 
in the electoral system, as the well the obstacles that 
opposition voices faced in a government-manipulated 
public sphere, contributed to the reduction of 
opposition representation in congress: in the 1951 
election Peronists obtained 90% of the seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Additional measures were 
implemented with the aim of weakening the electoral 
strength of opposition forces. In districts that had 
been electorally adverse, such as the city of Buenos 
Aires, the government engaged in gerrymandering 
practices that resulted in subsequent processes of 
district redesign in 1951 and 1954. In addition, a 1949 
law established electoral limitations on the formation 
of coalitions with the clear objective of preventing the 
emergence of a new “Unión Democrática”. 
Elections (and their complement, mass mobilizations) 
are conceived as mechanisms of acclamation, not of 
representation. Elections are understood in a plebiscitarian 
key as a mechanism that merely confirm a leader’s claim 
to incarnate the people. Thus elections do not function 
under a representative logic of production of temporary 
majorities and minorities or for that matter of a democratic 
leadership. Instead, they certify the dual nature of populist 
leadership: the leader “... was at the same time an elected 
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representative and a quasi-transcendental conductor of 
people” (Finchelstein, 2014: 199). Elections consequently 
acquire an extraordinary dimension; they represent an 
exceptional decisional moment that bestows upon the 
winner the right to impose his will over the rest of 
society. The following reflection of Perón regarding 
the meaning of his electoral triumph helps to illustrate 
the populist differences between this model of will 
formation and a liberal-representative one based on 
the deliberative interplay between majorities and 
minorities:
“... (we) confronted our firm and unbreakable 
will to the will of our opponents there is only one 
problem to elucidate: who is right and who has 
the acquired right to impose his own will? We 
have given the people the opportunity to choose, 
in the most honest election in Argentine history, 
between us and our opponents; the people have 
chosen us. Consequently, that problem is over. In 
the Argentine republic, what we decide is what is 
done.” (Perón, 1949: 9)
The electoral outcome forecloses any ulterior 
debate, conferring the “right to impose” the will 
of majoritarian forces over the rest of the political 
spectrum. In such conception, there is no space 
for the principle of legitimate opposition. Rather, 
those defeated at the ballot box are to subordinate 
themselves to the majoritarian will embodied in the 
person of the president. As Perón put it: 
“it is necessary to obey whatever the majority 
decides, for it is the only way in a democracy to 
realize the will of the majority.... The free play 
of wills lasts until a decision is made. Once the 
decision is made, there must be an unconditional 
subordination to the decision of the majority” 
(Perón 1949: 29).
As Bernard Manin argues, when the majority will 
be equalized to the general will, minorities lose all 
political status (Manin, 1987: 360). Democratization 
is conceived of as the imposition of an alleged 
“popular will” over the rest of society.  The latter opens 
up a questionable effort at political homogenization 
inspired by the untenable fiction of a unanimous will 
that leaves no space for critics of the administration:  
“Our doctrine... is a patriotic doctrine. 
Therefore, I see no inconvenience in introducing 
it everywhere.  If it were a bad doctrine I would 
be the first one in challenging it; but being a good 
one, we should try to introduce it everywhere, in 
all men and women so we can assure the triumph 
of a unified collective action.” (Perón, 1949: 46)
Erasing the distinction between 
constitutional and ordinary legislation 
The realization of the principle of popular sovereignty 
demands erasing the distinction between ordinary and 
constitutional law. The constitution must reflect, not 
limit, the majoritarian will. To this end, populist regimes 
engage in processes of constitution-making that seek 
to replace the liberal notion of limited government 
with the principle of “unlimited elected government”. 
The plebiscitarian understanding of elections has 
to be translated into constitutional terms. Populist 
constitutionalism appeals to a questionable notion of 
constituent power to dismantle constitutional limits 
on popular sovereignty. From such a perspective, 
rights should not be external to power but are an 
expression of it: constitutional norms should reflect 
popular aspirations, not limit them. The populist 
conception of constitutionalism was clearly reflected 
in the statement of the new President of the Supreme 
Court, who declared that:
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“The distinction of different governmental 
functions should not lead us to forget that the 
authority is always one. Expression of such 
authority is what the constitution refers to as 
the ʻsupreme chief,’ to whose will all executive 
decrees and judicial decisions should conform...” 
(Tomas Casares, quoted from Negretto 2012: 123)
Populist constitutionalism is hostile to the liberal 
notion of an autonomous judiciary. Such hostility 
translates into efforts at eliminating the autonomy 
of the judicial branch. Usually the first targets of 
populist administrations are apex courts, since they 
are the institution that is responsible for upholding 
the distinction between constitutional and ordinary 
politics (Arato 2017). Other targets are those agencies 
that integrate what Guillermo O’Donnell has referred 
as the mechanisms of horizontal accountability (lower 
courts, comptrollers, public prosecutors, electoral 
courts, ombudsmen, etc.) (O’Donnell 1993). Perón 
promoted the removal of the majority of Justices of the 
Supreme Court in his first year in office. In September 
1946, the Chamber of Deputies impeached all but 
one Justice of the Court (who had openly declared 
his support for Perón) with the vote of 104 deputies 
and the opposition of 47 members of the opposition. 
The Senate unanimously approved the removal of the 
Justices. 
Processes of constitutional reform also figure prominently 
in populist regimes. In 1948, Perón launched a 
constitution-making process whose aim was to establish 
“a Justicialist successor to the constitution of 1853” 
(Rock, 1987: 288). While the need for constitutional 
reform had been raised by other political forces, such 
as the Radical Party, the dynamics that the process of 
constitutional reform acquired indicated that the reform 
was not envisioned as a consensual undertaking. Under 
populism, processes of constitution-making adopt a 
supra-constitutional character: in this case, the process 
did not follow established amendment procedures, 
and instead the government resorted to a plebiscitarian 
strategy that resulted in the election of an unbound 
conventional assembly (Negretto 2012). The project 
of constitutional reform presented without previous 
announcement to the Chamber of Deputies on August 
13, 1948 did not specify which sort of amendments 
would be subject to debate and called for a full 
delegation of powers to a constitutional convention. 
The Radical Party objected, arguing that such a 
procedure would give the convention a blank check 
that could affect the integrity of basic principles of 
the structure of republican government, and that such 
a procedure was aimed at avoiding a parliamentary 
debate with the opposition (Negretto 2012). Despite 
the opposition’s objections, the project was approved 
and an electoral campaign for the election of 
conventional delegates took place that resulted in 
the victory of Peronism, whose supporters gained 
majoritarian control of the assembly. 
The dynamics of the constitution-making process 
was one of imposition, a logic that was conceptually 
justified by the main ideologist behind the reform. 
According to Arturo Sampay:
“A constitution determines the ordering of the 
governmental powers of a sovereign political 
community, the distributing of the functions of 
those powers, which one is the dominant sector 
in the political community and which are the 
goals assigned to the political community by that 
dominant sector.” (cited in Argumedo, 1989: 57)
The project that was finally approved express the 
personal wishes of Perón, who notably expanded his 
authority over the legislative branch, introduced the 
possibility of unlimited presidential reelection, and 
saw the emergency powers of the executive expanded 
and strengthened. Perón explicitly referred to the 
new document as being a “Peronist” or a “Justicialist” 
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constitution, underlining in this way the excluding 
logic that prevailed throughout the constitution-
making process. It is illustrative to see the way Perón 
referred to the 1949 Constitution as a document 
that exclusively reflected the political will of the 
majoritarian party:
“The essential principles of the Peronist doctrine 
now shine as the polar star of the nation in the 
preamble of the new Justicialist Constitution... 
no well born Argentine can refuse to support 
what we want when we affirm our irrevocable 
decision to constitute a socially just, economically 
independent, and politically sovereign nation, 
without relinquishing his/her title of Argentine.” 
(Perón, 1983: 175) 
In the eyes of the opposition, the brief constitution-
making process represented an empty act destined to 
satisfy presidential political ambitions, particularly 
of solving the problem of political succession by 
amending the article that banned the possibility of 
an immediate presidential reelection. The procedure, 
far from cementing a new institutional compromise, 
served to further polarize Argentine society into two 
irreconcilable camps. 
Undermining the centrality of liberal 
intermediating structures such as 
parliament and the public sphere
The privileging of elections as a mechanism of acclamation 
demand the parallel dismantling of representative 
instances of political intermediation: parliament and 
the public sphere. Under a plebiscitarian model, 
parliament is placed in a subordinate role towards 
the executive, acting fundamentally as a receptor 
and organizer of presidential decrees (Waldmann, 
1981: 63-64). During Perón’s years the absence of 
a strong legislative opposition facilitated the efforts 
at establishing the institutional supremacy of the 
executive over the other powers. Throughout the two 
administrations, Peronism dominated both chambers, 
facing only the opposition of a reduced number of 
Radical Party legislators in the chamber of deputies. 
The impressive legislative labor of the first years of 
Perón’s administration, which is frequently cited as 
an example of congressional dynamism, concealed 
the fact that most of those laws had originated in the 
executive.  In fact, many of the legislative measures 
represented mere ratifications of executive decrees 
that had been promulgated by the prior military 
regime. According to Mario Justo Lopez, in 1946 
congress approved around 500 decrees, in 1947, 56 
decrees and in 1949, 472 decrees, all dictated by the 
previous de facto administration (Lopez, 1961, p. 113). 
The 1949 constitution weakened the accountability 
role of the legislative over the executive power 
while simultaneously strengthening the legislative 
prerogatives of the presidency (Negretto 2012; 
Waldmann 1981: 63, 100-1). 
Another important intermediating structure that 
was seriously weakened was the public sphere. While 
in congress, Peronists employed their majority to 
undermine parliamentary debate, and a series of 
censorship and repressive measures sought to silence 
opposition voices in the media. The government 
seized control of newsprint distribution and exerted 
all sorts of pressures on opposition media outlets and 
journalists. Simultaneously, state sponsored media 
mounted relentless propaganda campaigns aimed at 
discrediting the independent media and opposition 
forces. The most vociferous opposition newspaper, 
La Prensa, was eventually expropriated and sold to 
the CGT labor union. Lastly, the government ran a 
chain of radio stations and newspapers as well as a 
generously financed system of state propaganda.
Through the described initiatives, Peronism 
produced a distinctive democratic model that 
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combined electoral and illiberal features into a new 
synthesis. Since then, modern populism established 
itself as a constant presence in democratic politics that 
acquired particular relevance in moments of political 
hardship. Populism erupts into the public sphere 
wherever representative institutions are in crisis, 
providing an alternative interpretation of democratic 
ideals. As such, it is a specter that haunts liberal 
representative regimes when they are weakened by 
citizen disaffection. In contemporary times, populism 
has made a comeback as many democracies are 
confronting economic hardships and growing political 
disaffection 
III. Populism’s comeback: the global 
diffusion of the populist democratic 
model
Populism returned with particular force in the aftermath 
of the third democratizing wave. The latter resulted 
in an impressive diffusion of liberal representative 
institutions to different regions of the world. In some 
regions, like Latin America and Europe, the process 
of democratization reached continental dimensions. 
It is precisely those regions where populism has made 
its strongest comeback, unlocking an ideological 
dispute over what democracy means. Contemporary 
populism gains prominence in already democratized 
societies in junctures where existing representative 
arrangements are in crisis: it appears as a democratic 
answer to the crisis of democracy. 
The populist wave started in Latin America in 1999 
with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, which 
was soon followed by Rafael Correa in Ecuador, 
Hugo Morales in Bolivia, and Kirchner in Argentina. 
It subsequently spread to Europe, most notably, 
Hungary and Poland, and lastly to the United States 
with the arrival of Donald Trump’s presidency. 2
The current centrality that modern populism 
enjoys is not only due to its geographical spread but 
also because of its attainment of governmental status 
in societies were populist forces were traditionally 
relegated to a politics of outsiders and marginal forces 
(Peruzzotti 2017). That is the case of Europe or the 
United States, where populist parties have gained a 
considerable electoral following in different countries 
and in some cases, reached power. Hungary, Poland, 
and the United States are experiencing the realities 
of populism as government as well as the attempts 
of those administrations to redefine the institutional 
landscape in a populist direction. Efforts at regime 
building took place or are currently underway in 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Hungary, and Poland. 
Many contemporary democracies are witness 
to efforts at establishing populist regimes whose 
genealogy can be traced back to those processes that 
took place in Latin America during the second wave of 
democratization. An analysis of the historical process 
that led to the creation of modern populism can shed 
light into the challenges that many democracies are 
confronting nowadays.
There is, however, an important distinction to 
make regarding the contextual conditions that marked 
the emergence of modern and contemporary forms 
of populism. Classical Peronism as well as the other 
regimes that followed in the 1940s and 1950s in Latin 
America, emerged in societies that were yet not fully 
democratized. In fact, populist movements played 
a pivotal role at democratizing regimes that were 
either openly authoritarian or semi-democratic by 
expanding  suffrage (and thus broadening the scope 
of electoral politics), promoting inclusionary welfare 
policies, and engaging in the politics of recognition. 
While some of those initiatives undoubtedly resulted 
in processes of social inclusion, the legacy of such 
2 On the global ascendancy of populism see De la Torre 2014; De la Torre and Peruzzotti 2008; Moffitt 2017; Judis 2016
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experiences is a troublesome one at the level of 
regime-building for they created an institutional 
blueprint that suppressed key dimensions of liberal 
representative democracy. In brief, modern populism 
was a specific path towards democratization, offering 
an alternative road to democracy than that of liberal 
representative democracy. While the democratic model 
they implemented had many questionable features, 
those experiences nevertheless represented a democratic 
accomplishment when contrasted with the regimes and 
societies that preceded them. 
By contrast, contemporary expressions of populism 
take place in already democratized societies. The most 
relevant expressions of populism as government have 
taken place in societies that had been successfully 
democratized during the third wave. So while the 
forms of political self-understanding of present 
populists do not significantly differ from those that 
inspired the building of populist regimes in the 1940s, 
contextual conditions set those two experiences apart. 
Contemporary populist governments emerged within 
democratic regimes that while facing serious crisis, 
still provided social and institutional mechanisms 
to make government accountable and could be set 
into motion to challenge the authoritarian features 
of those administrations. So the attempts by present 
administrations to redesign the institutional landscapes 
of current regimes in a plebiscitarian direction might 
be challenged by opposition forces within the political 
system or in the public sphere. 
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